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 The Court affirmed Lyons v. State, which gives the courts discretion to reject a 
defendant’s request for self-representation if the request is untimely. Further, the Court affirmed 
the Mendoza v. State test, which allows a single incident to sustain convictions for both robbery 
and kidnapping if any movement or restraint creates a risk to the victim substantially exceeding 
what is necessarily present in the crime of robbery. Finally, the Court held that the State must 




 Ana Cuevas was a FastBucks employee. One day, as she as walking toward the store, a 
man carrying a plastic bag with an object that Cuevas believed was a knife, approached her and 
ordered her to accompany him inside. Once inside, he sprayed the surveillance camera and 
ordered Ana to give him the money, as well as her personal wallet and cellphone. He then 
ordered her to disconnect the FastBucks telephone, poured chlorine on the floor in front of the 
door, and exited the store, locking Cuevas inside.  
 Detectives learned that the man was Robert Guerrina, a former FastBucks employee, who 
was staying at a Motel 6 in Las Vegas. After reviewing the surveillance video of the motel, 
which showed Guerrina entering the motel shortly after the incident, detectives decided not to 
make a copy of the tape because it did  not establish probable cause or an alibi.  
 At his arraignment, Guerrina was appointed  a public defender. Ten weeks later Guerrina 
moved to dismiss the public defender. Subsequently, Edward Hughes was appointed as his 
counsel. Eight months later, and twenty-four days before trial, Guerrina again moved to dismiss 
his attorney and moved to represent himself. The district court denied his request because it was 
untimely.  
Guerrina was found guilty of burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon, first 
degree kidnapping with use of a deadly weapon, robbery with use of a deadly weapon, and 




Guerrina’s sixth amendment right to self-representation was not violated 
 
 Although a criminal defendant has the right to self-representation under the Sixth 
Amendment,2 in Nevada, a court may deny the request if it is untimely, equivocal, or made 
solely for purposes of delay or if the defendant is disruptive.3 To determine whether a request is 
untimely, the court must consider whether the request can be granted without the need for a 
                                                     
1  By Xheni Ristani.  
2  Vasini v. State, 117 Nev. 330, 337, 22 P.3d 1164, 1169 (2001). 
3  Id. at 338.  
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continuance.4 If so, then the request is timely. The court may deny a request that is untimely  if 
there is no “reasonable cause to justify [the] late request.” 
 Guerrina argues that the Lyons timeliness test violates the Sixth Amendment right to self-
representation in Faretta v. California.5 However, in Faretta, the United States Supreme Court 
did not address the issue of timeliness. Accordingly, the Lyons timeliness rule is consistent with 
Supreme Court precedent.  
 Here, Guerrina needed a continuance if the request was granted. As such, under Lyons, 
the court had discretion to deny the request unless there was “reasonable cause to justify [his] 
late request”.6 However, since Guerrina presented no evidence to satisfy the reasonable cause 
requirement, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his request.  
 
The evidence was sufficient to support convictions of robbery and kidnapping 
 
 The evidence presented satisfies both of Guerrina’s convictions. First degree kidnapping 
occurs where a person “holds or detains” another person “for the purpose of committing. . .  
robbery upon or from the person.”7 “Robbery is the unlawful taking of personal property from 
the person of another, or in the person’s presence against his or her will, by means of force or 
violence or fear of injury. . . .”8 In Mendoza v. State, this Court held that in order to satisfy 
convictions for robbery and kidnapping from the same course of conduct, “any movement or 
restraint must stand alone with independent significance from the act of robbery itself, create a 
risk of danger to the victim substantially exceeding that necessarily present in the crime of 
robbery, or involve movement, seizure or restraint substantially in excess of that necessary to its 
completion.”9 
 Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, both convictions are 
supported. Guerrina approached Cuevas outside the building and forced her to go inside with 
him. By taking Cuevas from a public place to a private one, Guerrina substantially increased the 
risk of harm to her. Further, a rational trier of fact could have found that the pouring of bleach 
around the door and locking Cuevas in the store was in excess of what is necessary to complete 
the robbery. Therefore, both the robbery and kidnapping are affirmed.  
 
The evidence was insufficient to support a finding that Guerrina used or possessed a deadly 
weapon 
 
 To support that Guerrina committed robbery and kidnapping with the use of a deadly 
weapon, the State has to satisfy NRS 193.165(6). A knife is not necessarily a deadly weapon 
under NRS 193.165(6), and “deadly weapon” is not clearly defined within the context of 
burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon.  
Here, Guerrina’s burglary sentence was enhanced by NRS 205.060(4). However, there is 
no need to elaborate on this, because the record is devoid of any evidence that Guerrina’s 
weapon was deadly. Cuevas admitted that she never saw the blade of a knife, but assumed that 
                                                     
4  Lyons v. State, 106 Nev. 438, 446, 796 P.2d 210, 214 (1990).  
5  Faretta v. California, 417 U.S. 906 (1974). 
6  Id. at 446.  
7  NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.310(1) (2017). 
8  NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.380(1) (2017). 
9  Mendoza v. State, 122 Nev. 267, 275, 130 P.3d 176, 181 (2006).  
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the object was a knife. Further, she could not tell the difference between a corkscrew, a folding 
knife, and a folding comb when they were closed. Based on this, the use of a deadly weapon is 
stricken from Guerrina’s robbery and kidnapping convictions and the enhanced sentences are 
vacated. However, since it cannot be determined what portion of his burglary sentenced was 
enhanced due to the alleged deadly weapon possession, the Court remanded to the district court 
for resentencing the burglary conviction.  
 
Guerrina’s remaining claims are without merit 
 
 Guerrina argues that the State failed to prove coercion. Felony coercion requires the use 
or immediate threat of violence against a person or property, with “the intent to compel another 
to do or abstain from doing an act which the other person has a right to do or abstain from 
doing”.10 Here, Guerrina committed coercion because he ordered Cuevas to disconnect the 
FastBucks telephone. Given the circumstances, a reasonable jury could have concluded that 
Guerrina’s order was accompanied by a threat of physical force.  
 Guerrina also argues that the district court should have dismissed the indictment due to 
the detective’s decision not to obtain the Motel 6 tape, which constituted a failure to gather 
exculpatory evidence. To show this, Guerrina must demonstrate that the tape was material and 
the detective’s actions amount to negligence, gross negligence, or bad faith. Guerrina fails to 
show that the tape was material because he does not offer any evidence to contradict the 
detective’s testimony that the timing on the tape did not conflict with the timing of the robbery. 




 The Court affirmed the district court’s decision to deny Guerrina’s request to represent 
himself as untimely and affirmed Guerrina’s dual convictions of robbery and kidnapping. 
Finally, the Court vacated and reversed Guerrina’s deadly weapon enhancements pursuant to 
NRS 193.165 and remanded to the district court to resentence him for burglary.   
                                                     
10  NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.190(1)–(2)(a) (2017).  
